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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual 
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah 
corporation; and TERRY 
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a 
Jewelers & Loans, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—0000O0000 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
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BARROWS. ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop; 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation 
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual 
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY 
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a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
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Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn 
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The Defendants/Respondents Juanita Irene Burge, Robert D. 
Barrows, Jr., and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the "owners"), by and through their attorney of 
record, John T. Evans, hereby answer the Petition for Rehearing of 
the Defendants/Appellants Ellen K. Daskalas, individually and dba 
The Pawn Shop, Terry Pantelakis individually and dba AAA Jewelers 
& Loans, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"tenants"), dated November 9, 1989, on file herein, pursuant to 
request of the Court dated November 24, 1989. 
POINT I 
THE TENANTS HAVE NO COMPENSABLE RIGHT 
REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE "DATE OF 
TAKING11 OCCURRED 
Normally the date of service of Summons is the date fixed for 
valuing the property rights being acquired by condemnation. This 
is not a hard and fast rule, however, but only sets forth a 
presumption subject to change if it would result in an unfair or 
unjust award. The date of valuation has been determined to be 
seven and one-half years subsequent to the filing of the Summons 
as a result of delay in the proceedings. Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). "Courts have also 
set valuation dates prior to the service of Summons when the value 
of condemned property not initially included in the area to be 
condemned has been diminished by the condemnation of nearby 
properties pursuant to the planned condemnation of a large area." 
Id. at 830. 
Our Supreme Court has also held that the conduct of a party 
can amount to a waiver of their right to have damages assessed on 
the date of service of Summons, In Oregon S.L. & U.N.Ry. v, 
Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 P.693 (1891), summons was served on a 
trustee in deed of trust, then later the fee owner entered an 
appearance and waived Summons. The owner argued that the date of 
valuation should be the date Summons issued against the trustee. 
The court held that the owners waived that right when they entered 
their appearance. The above cases are particularly instructive 
to the question as to the date of take and valuation. Where the 
tenants could have terminated immediately, but instead voluntarily 
chose to remain in possession under their original contract rents, 
thereby reaping the benefit of any bonus value during the remaining 
13-month term without interruption, it would be unfair and unjust 
to hold that the date of valuation should still be the date of 
service of Summons as contended by the tenants. Their act of 
remaining in possession constituted a waiver by them of having 
their leasehold interest valued as of the date of service of 
summons. As long as they remain in possession, their interest in 
the real property remained undisturbed and unaffected by the 
condemnation action. The time of valuation would not be from the 
date of service of the Summons, but from the time when possession 
is taken, which in the instant case was not until after the lease 
had expired. Since there was no renewal of the lease and 
possession was retained by the tenants under the contract rents, 
they had no right to claim a bonus value whether as of the date of 
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service of Summons or otherwise. Gafnev Press, Inc. v. State, 
(1954) 206 Misc 1070, 135 NYS 2d 512 (attached hereto as exhibit 
"A") . The opinion of this court that the time of taking is the 
time possession is taken is not contrary to the provisions of 
Section 78-34-11 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended). 
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Bradley, 205 Kan. 242, 468 P.2d 
95 (1970), does not support the tenants' position that compensable 
leasehold rights were taken on the date of service of Summons 
because it appears that the right of possession is concurrent with 
the date of take. Tenants quote from the dissenting opinion to 
the effect that the tenants continued in possession for one and 
one-half months of their remaining 24 years after the taking date, 
but the majority opinion adopted the findings of the trial court 
to the effect that no interest remained in the property by anyone 
after the date of taking on March 9, 1966. 
The complete and entire right, title and 
interest of the plaintiff, lessee, and the 
landlords1 entire estate in the leased premises 
were taken on March 9, 19 66, and all their 
respective interests therein were extinguished. 
Id. at 98. 
Phillips does confirm that "the right of the lessee to 
compensation, as any other right, may be waived . . . " (Id. at 
98) , which is certainly what the tenants did in the instant case 
when they elected to remain in possession for the remainder of 
their lease. 
The whole basis for Phillips is that the tenants1 right to 
compensation is fixed when the tenant no longer has a lease: 
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It is the very general rule that the taking of 
an entire tract of land under lease by eminent 
domain abrogates the relation of landlord and 
tenant. Id. at 98. 
A valid taking of the whole premises, which 
divests the lessors title, terminates a lease. 
. . o Id. at 99. 
In the instant case, there was no change in the landlord/ 
tenant relationship which existed between the parties at the time 
Summons was served. This change only occurred after the lease 
expired by its terms and the tenants were occupying on a month-to-
month basis. The reason the relationship continued is because 
under Utah law the filing of a condemnation action vests no rights 
in the condemnor until after it obtains an order of occupancy 
(Section 78-34-9) or obtains a final judgment of condemnation 
(Section 78-34-15). Since neither of these events occurred, the 
landlord/tenant relationship continued unrestricted, unlike the 
Phillips case where there was a taking that terminated the 
relationship. In the instant case, the tenants cannot claim they 
had a right to damages from the date of service of Summons when 
they knew that by staying in possession of the property they 
suffered no loss or damage. 
Tenants argue that they had a right to an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the value of their bonus rights under the lease. The 
trial court did give the tenants a full evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of whether the tenants had any bonus rights and the trial 
court correctly found that the only right to compensation they 
would have would be for improvements, if any, they placed on the 
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property. Since the tenants remained in possession under the lease 
at contract rents for the remainder of the lease term and there was 
no renewal thereof, there was no reason to grant the tenants a 
hearing on the value of leasehold rights. They already received 
that value. The trial court did grant tenants the right to appear 
at trial and put on evidence concerning any improvements placed 
thereon by the tenants, but no evidence of any such improvements 
was ever forthcoming. The tenants simply failed to appear at the 
hearing on this issue, thereby waiving their rights to assert the 
same at this time. 
Tenants cite Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Company v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 470, 35 LEd 2d 1, 93 S. Ct. 791 (1973), in 
support of their argument that an evidentiary hearing "should have 
been accorded tenants to present evidence as to the fair market 
value of the existing leasehold interest." (Page 8 of Petition 
for Rehearing). In Almota, however, the hearing was held because 
a bonus value did exist which needed to be quantified. In the 
instant case, no bonus value existed. Contrary to tenants1 
assertion, there was no option to renew the lease in Almota, as 
clarified by the Court's statement that the issue of the case was: 
Whether, upon condemnation of a leasehold, a 
lessee with no right of renewal is entitled to 
receive as compensation the market value of its 
improvements without regard to the remaining 
term of its lease, because of the expectancy 
that the lease would have been renewed. 
(Emphasis added.) Id. 409 U.S. at 473 
It is appropriate for this Court to determine in this case 
that the time of the taking is when the condemning authority 
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actually takes possession of the leasehold property, but whether 
it is determined that the date of valuation is when the Summons was 
served or when possession was taken frc>m the tenants is not 
material because in either event the fact that the tenant remained 
in possession during the term of the lease at the contract rent 
indicates they have no bonus value to claim and no purpose would 
be served by holding a hearing for the purpose of quantifying the 
amount of such non-existent value. 
POINT II 
THE OWNERS HAVE A RIGHT TO BE AWARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Tenants assert that even though they did not prevail in their 
claim for a bonus value they should not be required to reimburse 
the owners for the expenses caused in defending against the 
tenants' claim, because such claims were "warranted" as shown by 
the Almota case. In Almota, the court allowed evidence of the 
possibility that a lease might be renewed, therefore, the tenants 
assert they also were justified in making a similar claim for bonus 
value due to the possibility of renewal. However, the claim 
asserted in Almota was not similar to the tenants' claim in the 
instant case. Almota allowed evidence of the possibility of a 
lease renewal to show the value of improvements placed on the 
property by the lessee. In the instant case, however, the tenants 
presented no evidence that they placed improvements on the property 
so the valuation of such improvements is not an issue. 
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In the instant case the only basis the tenants would have to 
make a claim for bonus value due to extension of a lease is if they 
had a right to extend at below market rents thereby creating a 
bonus value. Almota did not allow evidence of an extension for 
that purpose nor did the tenants have any valid claim due to a 
right to extend at below market rents because the lease provided 
that any extension would be granted only at newly renegotiated 
rents, and certainly such rents would reflect market conditions. 
So Almota does not stand for the proposition that the defendant 
could claim a bonus value arising out of a possible renegotiation 
out of a lease nor did the case involve any interpretation of an 
attorney's fee clause in the lease. The tenants1 claim for a bonus 
value based on a possible renewal simply was without merit. 
Even if the tenants felt they had a valid claim, if they do 
not prevail they must bear the burden of reimbursing the owners 
for their expenses under the attorney's fee clause of the lease. 
The tenants seem to want to apply some good faith test as a basis 
for any award against them for attorney's fees, but the lease makes 
no such allowance. Its intention is to reimburse the owners if 
they are required to incur expense as a result of conduct by the 
tenants contrary to the lease terms. Misguided intentions, however 
well meaning, are not defenses to their obligations under the 
attorney's fee provision. 
The tenants are not being penalized for filing an Answer that 
protects their rights in the event they had a valid bonus value. 
That did not cause the owners to incur expenses. Expenses were 
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caused by the tenants1 pursuit of an award for a non-existent bonus 
value and most of those expenses were incurred through litigation 
with the tenants occurring after the remaining 13 month lease 
period expired and tenants were in possession on a month-to-month 
basis. 
The tenants were not just protecting any potential claims in 
filing a responsive pleading. They went further and asserted that 
as of the filing of the Answer, while still in possession of the 
property paying the contract rent, they had an immediate right to 
an amount greater than 100% of the approved appraisal deposit with 
the Court. Their assertion of the right to the money has continued 
from that point until the present filing of the Petition for 
Rehearing, notwithstanding that they were allowed to complete their 
lease term uninterrupted. This unfounded demand caused the 
freezing of the funds on deposit with the court and necessitated 
that the owners defend against such claims at a trial on the issue 
of whether the tenants held any bonus value, and expenses were 
incurred by the owners as a result and continue to be incurred by 
the owners. 
None of the attorney's fees payable by the tenants under the 
terms of the lease were incurred in determining the amount to be 
awarded to the respective parties. The fees were incurred to 
defend against the tenants1 claim that they had any right to share 
in the award of just compensation. The question is not whether the 
tenants have a right to assert their claim, the question is whether 
the owners have a right to be compensated when the tenants fail to 
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establish such claim asserted pursuant to the lease. The leasehold 
provisions do not require that any distinction be made as to 
whether the tenants' claims were asserted in good faith. The fact 
that the claims were denied does indicate that they were without 
merit and, therefore, subject to the attorney's fee provision of 
the lease. 
POINT III 
THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER TRIAL 
REQUIRED AS TO THE ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 
Under Section IV of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, it 
appears that there is a misunderstanding that the amount of 
attorney's fees awarded at the trial level was based upon the 
submission of affidavits only and not based on a trial. As a 
result of this mistaken impression this court ordered that since 
the tenants contested the amount of fees they are entitled to a 
trial on that issue. The fact is that a trial already held on that 
issue and should not need to be duplicated. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on May 28, 1987, at which time 
Mr. Wall had the opportunity to present evidence and conduct cross-
examination pursuant to his request for a special setting for that 
purpose. At the time of the hearing, however, Mr. Wall decided to 
simply submit the matter on affidavit following his argument. It 
was at the conclusion of that hearing that the court awarded the 
sum of $9,000.00. These facts are set forth on pages 11-12 of the 
Brief of Respondent's Burge, Barrows & Barrows dated March 31, 
1988, on file herein, containing the citations to the record on 
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appeal, and states in part as follows: 
Subsequent to the trial a hearing was held 
on March 25, 1987, to rule on various motions, 
including the amount of attorney's fees that 
should be awarded the owners. At that 
hearing, evidence was admitted as to the amount 
of time which had been incurred by the owners1 
attorney in connection with the tenants' claim, 
the necessity of incurring those hours and the 
reasonableness of the amount of the fees 
incurred. This evidence was set forth in the 
owners' Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees 
From Tenants [footnote] which was admitted into 
evidence by Stipulation of the parties, subject 
to Mr. Wall's right of cross-examination and 
without prejudice to his argument that 
attorney's fees should not be awarded 
[footnote]. At the hearing the Court 
authorized the owners to submit an additional 
Affidavit regarding attorney's fees and ruled 
that the tenants could have a further hearing 
on the matter to present evidence as to the 
issue of attorney's fees and to afford the 
tenants their right of cross-examination 
[footnote]. On April 6, 1987, the owners 
submitted their Supplemental Affidavit in 
Support of Attorney's Fees From Tenants 
primarily summarizing the "record" [footnote] 
following which Mr. Wall set the matter for 
evidentiary hearing to be held on May 28, 1987. 
At that time, Mr. Wall filed his Affidavit, 
[footnote] but no further evidence was 
introduced and no cross-examination of the 
tenants' attorney was sought. The matter was 
argued and submitted on the Affidavits. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the Court awarded 
the sum of $9,000.00 attorney's fees to be paid 
by the tenants, as noted above, and inserted 
that amount as part of the Order and Judgment, 
which was then entered [footnote]. 
Inasmuch as a trial was held following submission of the 
Affidavits specifically at the request of tenants of which this 
Court was apparently not aware, at which the tenants were afforded 
the right of cross-examination and to put on other evidence, it is 
submitted that any additional trial as to the issue of the award 
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of $9,000.00 would be redundant and an unnecessary burden upon the 
trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
A just and fair award of compensation for a leasehold in 
which the tenants remained in possession would require a 
determination of value as of the date possession was actually taken 
rather than date of service of Summons, and by remaining in 
possession the tenants waived their right to have their leasehold 
valued as of service of Summons. It is not material whether the 
valuation of the leasehold interest was as of service of Summons 
or loss of possession because in either case the tenants lost no 
bonus value so there was nothing to vest on either date. Even if 
the tenants had a right to be compensated for the 13 months 
remaining under the lease term, it received the benefit of that 
right because they remained in possession under the contract rent 
thereby losing no bonus value and no extension of that lease 
occurred. Without a bonus value there is no reason for a hearing 
to determine amount other than the hearing concerning the value of 
improvements which the tenants were afforded but failed to attend 
or otherwise make a proffer. 
The tenants have asserted and continue to assert claims and 
demands to share in the proceeds of the condemnation long after 
remaining in possession during the full term of the lease and it 
is for this action, not for the filing of the Answer, that the 
tenants are required to compensate the owners for the expenses they 
have incurred. The tenants are not being penalized for asserting 
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a valid claim, but for asserting a right to a bonus value during 
the same period they remained in possession and for an alleged five 
year extension to which they have no rights. Since tenants' claims 
were not valid, the Owners should be compensated for defending 
against them. Tenants are not being penalized for trying to show 
the amount of just compensation, but for having no right to just 
compensation whatsoever. 
No further trial as to the award of $9,000.00 attorney's fees 
incurred at the trial level should be held and the Court of 
Appeals' decision ordering remand for that purpose should be 
modified and such award of $9,000.00 be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of December, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
- - rdl/r --'lie? 
John T. Evans 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Burge, Barrows 
f^id Barrows 
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612 135 NEW YORK SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 
practice as well as upon a course of conduct or other evidence which 
clearly demonstrates that there is no issue of substance to be tried. 
We think the court at Special Term correctly granted judgment for 
plaintiff. Under the form of pleading asserted by the plaintiff and the 
factual theory set forth in its moving papers and upon which the judg-
ment rests, the adjudication will not be deemed to prejudice a subsequent 
assertion by defendant of a right to recover under the terms of its con-
tract upon showing its own due performance of the conditions under-
taken ; and such a right is conceded by plaintiff on the argument of the 
appeal. 
The effect of the judgment presently entered, although on its face an 
absolute adjudication of rights between the parties, is that until proof 
has been adduced by defendant that the pounds have been delivered, 
plaintiff is entitled to the return of the dollars paid for the pounds. 
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed with costs. 
All concur. 
Judgment and order unanimously affirmed with costs. 
Order filed. 
( O * KIT NUMIER SYSTEM> 
2 v - W ^ - ^ - y y , ^ / 
The GAFNEY PRESS, Inc., Claimant v. The 
STATE of New York. 
Court of Claims of New York. 
Dec. 2, 1934. 
Action for damages for appropriation of leased premises by State. 
The claimant moved for order amending or vacating the judgment. The 
Court of Claims, Charles T. Major, J., held that claimant suffered no 
loss during period that it continued on premises after appropriation, pay-
ing same rent to State as it had paid under lease to lessor, and damages 
could only be computed from time of removal. 
Motion denied. 
1. Eminent Domain < =^3200 
In action for appropriation of lessee's leasehold interest by State, 
claimant had obligation to show loss as basis for damages. 
2. Eminent Domain (^ =3147 
Where leased premises are appropriated, lessee's damage is com-
puted by ascertaining the value of the unexpired portion of the lease on 
the appropriation date, less reserved rent, plus the value of irremovable 
fixtures, equipment and other appurtenances. 
EXHIBIT. A 
GAFNEY PRESS * 
Citeasl35N.Y.S.2&TE 
iJEminent Domain <S=»147 5 1 3 
g l Where, after appropriation of claimant 
mrniant was allowed to continue on for thneho!d interest by State 
wing State same rent as paid under lease, tPths before removal' 
Jffirig three months period, and damages were tent suffered no loss 
^removal. mputed from date 
» 
piscock, Cowie, Bruce, Lee & Mawhinney, Syra 
aid Henley, Syracuse, of counsel. or claimant 
Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Atty. Gen., Harold S. Coyne, 
rthe State. *ty. Gen., 
VJOR, Judge. 
iThis is a motion made on behalf of the claimant for an orde* 
ftacating the findings, conclusions and judgment, on the gn n« 
'"contain an error and mistake in the computation of the pe
 t 
fich claimant is entitled to damages. 
he decision in the above entitled claim, which was filed on Septe 
?19S4, contained the following findings: 
10. There remained a balance of 48 months on said lease from t 
e'of the appropriation to the date of termination thereof." 
Mi 
15. The lease of the claimant had 45 months to run from the date 
noval on July 1, 1953 to the expiration of said lease on March 31, 
57." 
P * 18. As a result of the appropriation herein by the State of New 
4c, the claimant was evicted from its leased premises and the value of 
lease which had 45 months to run was destroyed to its damage in the 
of $6075 00/' 
t is the contention of the claimant that damages should be aw arded 
the date of appropriation,—April 1, 1953, instead of July 1, 1953, 
date on which claimant vacated the premises. 
Jl] It is undisputed that, after the appropriation date, the claimant 
dearrangements with the State of New York to continue in possession 
[the leased premises and paid the agreed rental therefor until the date 
?removal. Damage is based on loss, and it is claimant's obligation to 
low such loss. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 
7S.Q. 459, 54 L.Ed. 725. 
||2] The general rule is that the damage is computed by ascertaining 
jyalue of the unexpired portion of the lease on the appropriation date, 
(reserved rent, plus the value of irremovable fixtures, equipment and 
appurtenances. Schreiber v. Chicago & Evanston R. R. Co., 115 
1340, 3 N.E. 427; Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. An-
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drews, 52 Cal.App. 788, 205 P. 1085; Bernagozzi v. Mitchell Realty Co., 
Inc., 133 Misc. 594, 232 N.Y.S. 666; Bacorn v. People, 195 Misc. 917, 
88 N.Y.S.2d 628. 
In the Schreiber case [115 111. 340, 3 N.E. 430] above cited, the Court 
held: 
"It is not reasonable that a party should ask to be compensat-
ed for the loss of an unexpired term when, in fact, he has had 
the full enjoyment of his entire term * * * "# 
In Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Andrews, supra, the 
Court commented in 52 Cal.App. on page 793, 205 P. on page 1087: 
"An anomalous and unbearable condition would be presented 
if, under that rule, the public could be required to pay for a 
leasehold interest not taken, but which the lessee held unmolest-
ed to the end of the term". 
[3] For three months after the appropriation, an amicable arrange-
ment existed herein between the State and the claimant, whereby the 
claimant continued to occupy the premises and pay the same rent to the 
State as paid to the original owner. Claimant suffered no loss for this 
period. The value of the unexpired term of claimant's lease on the date 
of the appropriation must be reduced by the value of the time which 
claimant occupied the premises pursuant to the new arrangement There-
fore, the damage should be computed from the date of claimant's remov-
al. Schreiber v. Chicago & Evanston R. R. Co., supra; City of Cincin-
nati v. Schmidt, 14 Ohio App. 426; Los Angeles County Flood Control 
District v. Andrews, supra. 
No reason existed requiring the State to counterclaim on this point. 
Under the arrangement, no rent remained to be paid. 
Although the above cited cases do not apply to damages for a portion 
Of the unexpired lease, they hold substantially that where the tenant oc-
cupied and enjoyed the premises during the balance of the term of the 
lease after the appropriation date, he would not be entitled to compensa-
tion for a leasehold interest not actually surrendered. The same logic 
should apply to a part-time occupancy by agreement. 
The claimant, having made arrangements with the State of New York 
for the occupation of the leased premises, is entitled to damages from the 
date of removal. 
The motion herein is denied. 
Submit order accordingly. 
